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CONSTITUTI ONAL LAW-LIMITATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM OF
RELIGION
Defendant, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, entered an apartment house for the purpose of circulating religious pamphlets and
publicizing a lecture. A rule, agreed upon orally by the tenants and
the landlord, prohibited any visitors from calling upon a tenant unless
their names were confirmed and their visits announced from the desk
in the lobby. Defendant ignored the rule, was warned, and then
was arrested. He was convicted under VA, CODE ANN. §4480 (a)
(Michie, 1942) which declares it to be an unlawful trespass "if any
person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon the
land or premises of another, after having been forbidden to do so by
the owner, lessee, custodian, or other person lawfully in charge or
possession of such land." On appeal, held, affirmed. The only
purpose of the statute is to protect rights of owners or those in lawful charge of property; the statute does not infringe upon freedom of
speech, press, assembly, or worship as guaranteed by the Federal and
Virginia Constitutions and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom,
VA. CODE ANN. §34 (Michie, 1942). Hall v. Commonwealth, 188
Va. 72, 49 S. E. 2d 369 (1948); certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 240
(1948).
A person's right to exercise "religious freedom," which may
be manifested by acts, ceases where it overlaps and transgresses the
rights of others.x Freedom to distribute information to every citizen
wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation
of a free society that, aside from reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.
Accordingly, a state or municipality cannot impose a license tax as
a condition to the distribution of religious tracts and pamphlets upon
the streets, sidewalks, or other public places.z A municipal ordinance forbidding any person to knock on doors, ring doorbells, or
otherwise summon to the door the occupants of any residence for the
purpose of distributing to them handbills or circulars, as applied to a
person distributing advertisements for a religious meeting, is invalid
under the Federal Constitution as a denial of freedom of speech and
religion.3 A state statute prohibiting minors from selling magazines,
newspapers, or periodicals in public places is not invalid as coatravening freedom of religion when applied to the distribution of religious matter by minors.4 This is justified under the inherent power
of the state to protect the health and safety of its children. A socalled "trespass after warning" statute (similar to the Virginia statute
here involved) is constitutionally inapplicable to the streets of a
company-owned town,s or those of a village owned by the federal
government.6 On a set of facts similar to those of the principal

case, except that the prohibition was written into the lease, the Court
of Appeals of New York denied that such a regulation violated freedom of speech or worship.7 The distinction is made that the regulation is effective only inside the apartment buildings and not on
the streets. The regulation is for the protection of private property
and the right of privacy. The rule did not absolutely debar these
ministers from their visits in the building and their persuasions therein, since such were allowed whenever a tenant so desired and expressed his desire. The inner hallways of an apartment house cannot be regarded in the same light as public streets and cannot be
considered places of public assembly. In the words of Mr. Justice
Jackson, "The real question is where their rights end and the rights
of others begin."8 One line is here drawn: there is no right to go
beyond the streets and into abutting homes against the wishes of the
occupants or owners.
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